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Abstract
We incorporate word of mouth (WoM) in a classic Maskin-Riley contracting problem, allow-
ing for referral rewards to senders of WoM. Current customers’ incentives to engage in WoM
can affect the contracting problem of a firm in the presence of positive externalities of users.
We fully characterize the optimal contract scheme and provide comparative statics. In partic-
ular, we show that offering a free contract is optimal only if the fraction of premium users in
the population is small. The reason is that by offering a free product, the firm can incentivize
senders to talk by increasing expected externalities that they receive and this is effective only
if there are many free users. This result is consistent with the observation that companies that
successfully offer freemium contracts oftentimes have a high percentage of free users.
∗Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, e-mail:
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“Cost per acquisition: $233-$388. For a $99 product. Fail.”
—Drew Houston, founder of Dropbox
1 Introduction
In April 2010, Dropbox announced that it would start a referral program, increase visibility of its
free 2 GB option, and introduce a sharing option. All in all, this led to 2.8 million direct referral
invites within 30 days.1 Before the change, the costs per acquisition had been more than 200
dollars for a 99 dollar product, so Dropbox was not even able to survive in the market without
word of mouth (WoM). The introduction of the sharing option makes Dropbox a “social product,”
with which users experience positive externalities from friends using the product. Similarly, WoM
was essential for the growth of another social product, Skype. The company founded in 2003 spent
nothing on marketing until it was acquired by eBay when it already had 54 million registered users.2
Both Dropbox and Skype use the so-called “freemium” (a free contract + premium contracts)
strategy. However, the former combines it with a referral program, which Houston (2010) empha-
sizes as a way to encourage WoM, while the latter does not. Why has Skype never introduced a
referral program even though Dropbox has been so successful with it?
In this paper, we analyze the incentive for old customers (senders of WoM) to talk to new
customers (receivers) who are offered a menu of contracts as in Maskin and Riley (1984). The firm
can reward senders directly through referral rewards. A reward to the receivers via a free contract
increases the likelihood of them using the product. This in turn raises the size of the expected
externalities the senders receive from talking, and thus encourages WoM as well. All in all, the
model highlights a fundamental difference between a referral reward and a “freemium” strategy
when it comes to encouraging WoM. The key question is: when does the firm want to offer referral
rewards versus a freemium that increases the receiver’s probability to purchase?
The key components of the model can be justified in many ways. An externality can be a
real value of social usage or psychological benefit from having convinced a friend to use the same
product (Campbell et al., 2015). The sender may also benefit from the continuation value in a
repeated relationship with the receiver. The argument also requires that there is an exogenous
cost of talking for the sender. There are many reasons why talking may be costly: senders incur
opportunity costs of talking (Lee et al., 2013), and/or they may feel psychological barriers. We
assume that each sender wants to talk if and only if the cost of talking is smaller than the benefit.
Figure 1 offers a schematic presentation of the main logic.
The optimal scheme that we completely characterize exhibits a rich pattern of the use of referral
rewards and free products, depending on the parameters in the model. Roughly speaking, the model
predicts that referral rewards must be used if externalities are low. Free products can substitute




Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the sender’s trade off
Dropbox’s compositions of customer bases. Conditional on the fraction of “premium users” being
low, referral rewards are not used if externalities are high, which is consistent with Skype’s strategy.
When the externalities are not too low or too high, referral rewards are used in conjunction with
free contracts, which is consistent with Dropbox’s strategy.
Consequently, our view on freemium is consistent with a paradoxical feature of the customer
base of the aforementioned companies: While profits kept increasing, Dropbox faced consistently
only 4% of customers actually paying for the product.3 Similarly, only 8% of the customers who
are served by Skype actually pay. In our model, the reason to use free contracts is to boost up the
expected externalities that the sender receives. The “jump” of the expected externalities is large
(and thus effective in incentivizing WoM) only when the fraction of users who would otherwise not
use the product is high and externalities are not too small. This is why, in our model, free products
are used by companies like Dropbox and Skype.
Notably, a free contract arises endogenously in our model. Low valuation customers can be
thought of as customers whom the firm should not serve absent the need to encourage WoM. If
the firm serves these customers to incentivize WoM, however, it is optimal to offer just enough to
make those low-type customers use the product, making zero the only possible price to low-type
customers. Although our main model is built in a way to draw this conclusion in the simplest
possible setting with two receiver types, one of the extensions (Section 4.2) considers continuous
types and standard value functions, which leads to the existence of free contracts. In this extension,
we also show that only the marginal type who buys the free contract is made indifferent between
using the product and not using the product while other “higher” low types enjoy some surplus
from using the product while paying a zero price.
Technically, the full characterization of the optimal contract is involved for two reasons. First,
there is a non-monotonicity of the use of rewards with respect to the size of externalities. That
3See Economist (2012).
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is, it is possible that the optimal reward changes from positive to zero and back to positive when
externalities are increased because free contracts can “substitute” rewards. We formalize what we
mean by substitution, and explain how the two strategies (rewards and free contracts) interact in
characterizing the optimal scheme. This effect results from the aforementioned incentive constraint
of the sender. Second, the total cost of offering free contracts is determined by two factors, that is,
the production cost (which is low for products such as Skype and Dropbox) of the free products
and informational asymmetry, which forces the firm to pay an information rent to high-valuation
buyers. This total cost of offering free contracts plays a key role in fully characterizing the optimal
incentive scheme.
We employ several robustness checks in order to show that our insights are not an artifact of
the assumptions we impose in the model. First, we show that introducing heterogeneity in the
costs of WoM does not change the qualitative results. Moreover, for a continuous type space of
receivers (rather than only allowing for low-valuation and high-valuation receivers), we show that
free contracts correspond to bunching at the bottom, i.e., among the customers who purchase
positive quantities, customers buying the free contract correspond to a positive mass at the bottom
of the type distribution. Importantly, all receivers who buy the free contract (except for the
very lowest type) receive positive surplus. We also show how some results change if we allow for
externalities both on the sender and receiver side, as well as when externalities depend on the
quantity consumed. In yet another extension, we let the senders be better informed than the firm,
and show that in general the optimal reward must additionally depend on the type of receiver
being acquired. We also consider a model in which a receiver can be reached by many senders,
and illustrate qualitative robustness of our results. We then discuss what the socially optimal
contract scheme would look like if the social planner had control over the sender’s actions. It turns
out that free contracts are underutilized under the optimal scheme relative to the social optimum
because the firm does not fully internalize the benefits from externalities and gains from trade with
the receivers (corresponding to the information rent). Finally, in order to motivate the particular
modeling choice, we analyze models with no or perfect price discrimination options for the firm,
and argue that those models do not fit the markets we have in mind well.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, analyzes the benchmark case
in which there is no cost of talking for senders, and demonstrates some basic properties that the
optimal menu of contracts and referral reward schemes must satisfy. The main analysis presented
in Section 3 completely characterizes the optimal menu of contracts and referral reward scheme,
and conducts comparative statics. Section 4 discusses various extensions, robustness checks, and
welfare considerations. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are deferred to the Appendix. The detailed
analysis of the model with heterogeneous cost of talking and a discussion on the effect of advertising
can be found in the Online Appendix.
3
1.1 Related Literature
Our contribution is to show that a firm can encourage WoM indirectly through free contracts given
to the receiver. This explanation complements the existing explanations in the literature on how
to encourage WoM:4 Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) compare the benefits of price reduction and referral
programs in the presence of WoM. In their model, a reduced price offered to the sender of WoM is
beneficial because it makes the sender “delighted” and thereby encourages him to talk. Depending
on the delight threshold, the seller should use one of the two strategies or both. In contrast, our
focus is on WoM in the presence of positive externalities of talking and our model accommodates
menus of contracts. In Campbell et al. (2015), senders talk in order to affect how they are perceived
by the receiver of the information. The perception is better if the information is more exclusive.
Thus, a firm can improve overall awareness of the product by restricting access to information
(i.e., by advertising less). One could interpret the positive externalities in our model also as a
reduced form of a “self-enhancement motive” as in their model. Although we discuss advertising in
the Online Appendix, we focus on the relative effectiveness of free contracts and referral rewards
instead of advertising. Kornish and Li (2010) consider the tradeoff between referral rewards and
pricing in a model where the sender cares about the receiver’s surplus and the firm offers a single
price. Due to the assumption of a single price, any price set by the firm generating strictly positive
profits is necessarily strictly positive, so it cannot accommodate free contracts. Our model, on the
other hand, allows for screening by the firm and we analyze how that interacts with referral rewards
in the presence of externalities. This enables us to give predictions consistent with the strategies
used by various companies.
Most of the other theoretical literature on WoM has focused on mechanical processes of com-
munication in networks. This literature mostly focuses on how characteristics of the social network
affect a firm’s optimal advertising and pricing strategy. Campbell (2012) analyzes the interaction
of advertising and pricing.5 Galeotti (2010) is concerned with optimal pricing when agents without
information search for those with information. Galeotti and Goyal (2009) show that advertising
can become more effective in the presence of WoM (i.e., WoM and advertising are complements) as
well as that it can be less effective (i.e., WoM and advertising are substitutes). All of these papers
consider information transmission processes in which once a link is formed between two agents,
they automatically share information.
Costly communication has been studied in the context of working in teams where moral hazard
problems are present between the sender and receiver, as introduced by Dewatripont and Tirole
(2005). Dewatripont (2006), for example, applies their model to study firms as communication net-
works. Instead, our model does not involve moral hazard but a screening problem, and externalities
(which are absent in Dewatripont (2006)) play a key role in formulating the optimal contracting
scheme.6
4See also Godes et al. (2005) for a survey of the literature.
5On the empirical side, Godes and Mayzlin (2009) analyze the roles of loyal customers and opinion leaders in the
context of WoM. Schmitt et al. (2011) study how valuable referred customers are in the data.
6Lobel et al. (2016, Forthcoming) also consider a model with costly referrals (with no screening), focusing on a
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There is also a literature on contracting models in the presence of network effects. Besides the
critical difference that our focus is on how the firm can optimally affect incentives to talk, there is
a subtle difference in the optimal contracts. Csorba (2008) analyzes a contracting model in which
the more the other buyers use the product, the higher the utility from using the product is.7 He
shows that an optimal contract scheme introduces a distortion at the top because a reduction of
the quantity offered to low types should decrease the value of the product to high types. Unlike in
his model, we have no distortions at the top in the optimal contract scheme. The reason is that
receivers do not receive externalities from each other, and that we consider quantity-independent
externalities rather than assuming that the total quantity consumed generates externalities. We
discuss the implications of quantity-dependent externalities in Section 4.4. We do not consider the
case of externalities between receivers themselves given our focus on the sender’s incentives to talk.
Introducing such a feature would not change the qualitative results on the optimal incentive schemes
to encourage WoM. The modeling difference leads to the difference in terms of applications. When
the focus is on receivers generating externalities to each other, the model would be suitable for the
analysis of, for example, social networks such as LinkedIn or Facebook. In such a context, a recent
working paper by Shi et al. (2017) considers a static model of product line design without WoM
when free users generate positive externalities on all premium users. When the firm can manipulate
the amount of externalities enjoyed by customers conditional on the user type, freemium contracts
can arise as an optimal strategy. In contrast, in our model, there is no manipulation of the size of
externalities and the price of the low-type contracts must be zero because the surplus from selling
to the low types is negative. Even so, the monopolist sells contracts with positive quantities for
free to the low types because those free contracts encourage WoM which attracts premium users.
While the focus of this paper is not to add another rationale for freemium strategies, it is impor-
tant to note the connection to the literature on “freemium” strategies. The literature has identified
various other reasons: (i) free contracts may be useful in penetration of customers or information
transmission about the quality of the product to them, which can induce their upgrade,8 (ii) the
firm may hope that the free users will refer someone who will end up using the premium version,9,10
(iii) free products attract attention of customers and prevent them from purchasing the competitors’
products, and (iv) the increased number of customers due to free contracts raises the advertising
revenue or sales of data.11 None of these reasons pertains to the senders’ incentives. Instead, our
focus (with regards to free contracts) is on how free contracts help firms to manage senders’ incen-
tives. Thus, instead of convoluting our model with these other aspects of free contracts, we aim to
isolate the effect of the tradeoff that the senders of information face. Similarly, we do not intend
referral game played by customers on a network.
7See Segal (2003) for a seminal work on this literature. See also Hahn (2003).
8Formally, we rule out this effect by supposing that, after learning about the existence of the product, each
customer has a fixed valuation to (and information about) the product that does not change over time.
9A recent working paper by Ajorlou et al. (2015) builds a social-network model that highlights this effect.
10Lee et al. (2015) empirically analyze the trade-off between growth and monetization under the use of freemium
strategies. In their paper, the value of a free customer is determined by upgrade as in (i) and the free users’ referrals
as in (ii).
11See Shapiro and Varian (1998) for (i)-(iii) and Lambrecht and Misra (2016) for (iv).
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to create a “complete” model that incorporates all conceivable features that are relevant for firms’
decision making. Instead, the goal of this paper is to understand how the incentives for WoM can
be managed. Our simplification allows us to isolate the factors pertaining to the encouragement of
WoM and to examine the tradeoffs involved.
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Basics. We consider a monopolist producing a single product at constant marginal cost c > 0.
Senders (male) {1, . . . , N} can inform receivers, (female) {1, . . . , N} about the existence of the
product. The monopolist’s goal is to maximize the expected profit generated by receivers by
offering them a menu of contracts (as in Maskin and Riley (1984)) and, in addition, offering a
referral scheme to senders.
Receivers’ preferences. Each receiver privately observes her type θ ∈ {L,H} that determines
her valuation of the product. It is drawn independently such that a receiver is of type H with
probability α ∈ (0, 1) and of type L otherwise. A type-θ receiver is associated with a valuation
function vθ : R+ → R that assigns to each quantity (or quality) q her valuation vθ(q).12 Over the
strictly positive domain, i.e., q ∈ (0,∞), we assume that vθ is continuously differentiable, strictly




L(q) for all q and limq→∞ v
′
H(q) < c. We
assume that vH(0) = vL(0) = 0, which can be interpreted as the utility of the outside option of not
using the product at all. We make the following additional assumptions:
Assumptions. 1. (Minimum quantity for low types) ∃q > 0 such that vL(q) = 0.
2. (No gains from trade with low types) v′L(q) < c for all q ≥ q.
3. (Gains from trade with high types) There exists a q > 0 such that vH(q) > q · c.
The first assumption can be interpreted as low types incurring some fixed installation cost of
the product, and the low valuation buyer only wanting to start using the product if a minimum
quantity of q > 0 is consumed.13 This assumption together with the normalization that vL(0) = 0
and the assumption that vL is strictly increasing in the strictly positive domain implies that the
function vL is necessarily discontinuous at q = 0 because vL is strictly increasing on the strictly
positive domain.14 The second assumption captures that there are some consumers who would
never use the product if they were not needed to incentivize WoM. Without the third assumption,
the monopolist would not be able to earn positive profits, so the problem becomes trivial.
Senders’ preferences and WoM technology. First, each sender i observes the monopolist’s
choice of menu of contracts and referral scheme (specified below). Each sender i then decides
12In this paper we use quantity and quality exchangeably. Interpreting q as quality would make a difference if we
had learning about quality in the model, where using different contracts may result in different ex-post valuations.
13Note that this does not preclude the possibility of positive fixed installation costs for high types.
14Recall also that continuous differentiability of vL is assumed only on the strictly positive domain.
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whether to inform receiver i at a cost ξ ≥ 0 or not.15 We denote sender i’s action by ai ∈
{Refer,Not}, where ai = Refer if sender i refers receiver i and ai = Not otherwise. If (and only if)
receiver i learns about the product, she decides whether to purchase a contract or not, and whether
to consume the product or not upon purchasing. If receiver i consumes a positive quantity, sender
i receives externalities r ≥ 0.16
Monopolist’s problem. As in Maskin and Riley (1984), the monopolist offers a menu of
contracts given by ((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) ∈ (R× R+)2 to receivers, where qθ is the quantity type θ is
supposed to buy at a price pθ. Furthermore, she offers a reward scheme R : {L,H} → R+ such
that a sender receives R(θ) if he has referred a receiver who purchases the θ-contract. Rewards
are assumed to be nonnegative because otherwise senders would be able to secretly invite new
customers. We assume that the monopolist only receives revenue from new customers who do
not know about the product unless a sender talks to them. In order to exclusively focus on the
senders’ incentive to talk, we assume that the monopolist receives no revenue from senders. Thus,
the monopolist solves
max





α · (pH − qH · c)) + (1− α) · (pL − qL · c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total average profit per referred receiver
− (αR(H) + (1− α)R(L))
) (1)
subject to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints given by17
max{vH(qH), 0} − pH ≥ max{vH(qL), 0} − pL (H-type’s IC)
max{vL(qL), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL(qH), 0} − pH (L-type’s IC)
max{vH(qH), 0} − pH ≥ 0 (H-type’s PC)
max{vL(qL), 0} − pL ≥ 0 (L-type’s PC)
 (2)
and for all i, ai = Refer if and only if
ξ ≤ r
(
α+ (1− α) · 1{qL>0,vL(qL)≥0}
)
+ (αR(H) + (1− α)R(L)) (Senders’ IC)
Let Π∗ denote the value of this problem. The monopolist chooses contracts given by quantities
and prices, while managing WoM. The management of WoM appears as the senders’ incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint. On the left hand side is the cost of talking, ξ, which we assume to
be homogeneous across senders. This simple case allows us to illustrate the main trade-offs. As a
robustness check, the Online Appendix analyzes the case of heterogeneous costs in detail.18 On the
right hand side, the quantity sold to L-type receivers qL affects WoM by controlling the expected
15Section 4.6 examines the case in which multiple senders talk to a single receiver.
16While we set up the problem such that the referred customer does not receive r for notational simplicity, assuming
that they do would not change the essence of our analysis. We discuss this point in Section 4.3.
17An implicit assumption in the participation constraints (the last two inequalities) is that the outside option
generates zero surplus. This is only a normalization; in particular, as long as limq→∞ vL(q) is no less than the value
of the outside option, the result that the price for the low-type product is 0 still holds (although the quantities offered
are adjusted accordingly) even if the outside option generates a positive surplus.
18We summarize the main insights of that analysis in Section 4.
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externalities given by r
(
α+ (1− α) · 1{qL>0,vL(qL)≥0}
)
. The senders’ optimal decision determines
the value of the indicator function in the objective function and thereby controls the number of
informed receivers.
Let us explain a few assumptions implicit in this formulation. First, as standard in contract
theory, we assume tie-breaking conditions for senders and receivers that are most favorable for the
monopolist. Senders who are indifferent between referring and not will refer, and receivers that
are indifferent between buying and not buying always buy. Second, we assume that if the buyer
purchases a contract (p, q) such that vθ(q) < 0, then the monopolist cannot “force” the receiver to
consume even if she pays the buyer a negative price. Thus, a type-θ receiver who purchases such a
contract enjoys utility max{vθ(q), 0}.
2.2 Benchmark with free WoM
We first consider a benchmark case where ξ̄ = 0, i.e., WoM is costless and customers are automat-
ically informed about the product. Then, the monopolist simply solves the classic problem as in
Maskin and Riley (1984):
Πclassic ≡ max
pH , pL∈R qH ,qL≥0
α · (pH − qH · c) + (1− α) · (pL − qL · c)
subject to the constraints (2). It is always optimal for the seller not to sell to L-type buyers such
that q∗L = 0 and the optimal quantity q
∗






3, strict concavity, continuous differentiability of vH and limq→∞ v
′
H(q) < c ensure that there is a




H) and the maximal static profit is
Πclassic = α · (p∗H − q∗H · c). All in all, we can summarize our findings as follows:
v′H(q
∗





classic = α · (p∗H − q∗H · c).
2.3 Preliminaries
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we present several preliminary results. First, observe
that R(·) affects the monopolist’s optimization problem only through the ex ante expected reward
R ≡ αR(H) + (1− α)R(L). Thus, profits are identical for all reward schemes R(·) that share the
same expected value. Formally, this means:
Lemma 1 (Reward Reduction). If a menu of contracts ((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) ∈ (R × R+)2 and a
reward scheme R∗∗ : {L,H} → R+ solve (1), then the same menu of contracts ((pL, qL), (pH , qH))
and any reward scheme R : {L,H} → R+ with E[R] = E[R∗∗] solve (1).
Despite being a simple observation, this result implies an important feature of the optimization
problem faced by the firm. As long as the firm and the senders have the same expectation about
19This conclusion can be different if L-type customers generate other revenues such as advertising revenue. In our
applications (Skype, Dropbox, Uber, etc.), however, advertising revenue seems not to play an important role.
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the receivers’ types, there is no reason for the firm to condition their payment on the purchased
contract. Indeed, in Section 4.5 we show that if the senders have more accurate information about
the receivers’ types than the firm, the conclusion of Lemma 1 no longer holds. Thus, the detail of
the optimal reward scheme crucially depends on the senders’ knowledge. We relegate the analysis
of this detail to Section 4.5, while here we consider senders who have the same information about
the receiver’s types as the firm does. Note also that Lemma 1 does not imply that the sender
receives referral rewards when the receiver does not end up using the product, for example when
the low types are offered zero quantity.20
Plugging the sender’s IC constraint into the objective function and noting that all senders share





α · (pH − qH · c) + (1− α) · (pL − qL · c)−R
] (3)
subject to the constraints (2). We prove the existence of a solution to this problem. It is not
immediate as the objective function is not necessarily continuous, but right-continuity of those
functions and the fact that the number of discontinuous points is finite suffices to establish exis-
tence.21
Proposition 1 (Existence). The maximization problem (3) subject to (2) has a solution.
We denote the (non-empty) set of solutions to this problem by
S ⊆ (R× R+)2 × R+.
Moreover, for any menu of contracts ((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) satisfying (2), we denote the firm’s expected
profits obtained from a receiver conditional on being informed by
π((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) = α(pH − qH · c) + (1− α)(pL − qL · c).
The monopolist can always choose not to sell to anyone and attain zero profits, i.e., Π∗ ≥ 0.
Furthermore, whenever Π∗ = 0 the seller can attain the maximum by inducing no sender to talk.
This can be done by offering unacceptable contracts to receivers and no rewards.22 We, thus, focus
the characterization of optimal menu of contracts and rewards programs on the case when Π∗ > 0.23
The following lemma summarizes some basic properties of optimal menus of contracts.
20We can set R(L) = 0 and R(H) = R/α, so that senders who refer low types receive zero referral rewards.
21The proof is done in a more general context, in which after each sender i sees the menu of contrast, he privately
observes his cost of talking drawn from an independent and identical distribution with a cumulative distribution
function that has at most finitely many jumps.
22Note that if there is a positive mass of senders with ξ = 0, then by Assumption 3 the seller can attain strictly
positive profits by only selling to H-receivers and offering no reward.
23In part 1 of Theorem 1, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for Π∗ > 0 to hold.
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Lemma 2. If Π∗ > 0 and ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) ∈ S, then:
(i) Low types don’t pay: qL ∈ {0, q} and pL = 0.24
(ii) No distortions at the top: qH = q
∗
H .
(iii) No free contracts: If qL = 0, then pH = p
∗
H .
(iv) Free contracts: If qL = q, then pH = p
∗
H − vH(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rent
≡ p̃∗H .
Intuitively, the only benefit of selling to L-type receivers is that it increases the probability of
the receiver using the product. Consequently, if a positive quantity is sold to L-type receivers, then
it must be just enough to incentivize usage but no more. Moreover, the participation constraint
of the L-type must be binding (as in Maskin and Riley (1984)). Similarly, there are no distortions
at the top. Parts (iii) and (iv) follow because the incentive compatibility constraint of H-type
receivers must be binding.
Lemma 2 restricts the set of possible optimal contracts significantly. In particular, it uniquely
pins down the price offered to low types and the quantity offered to high types whenever Π∗ > 0.
At a price of zero for low types, the seller either chooses qL = 0 (no free contracts) or qL = q
(free contracts). A full characterization of optimal contracts requires us to characterize the optimal
reward scheme R and whether free contracts are optimal for the monopolist. These choices depend
on the parameters that have not been used so far: the cost structure, the magnitude of externalities,
and the composition of different types of buyers.
3 Main Analysis
3.1 Characterization of Optimal Scheme
We characterize the optimal contracts in steps. First, we characterize the optimal referral reward
scheme given a menu of contracts satisfying (2) (Lemma 3). Then, we solve for the optimal menu
of contracts (Lemma 4) and finally, use these optimal contracts to derive the optimal reward using
Lemma 3 (Theorem 1).
With homogeneous costs of talking, if r
(
α+ (1− α) · 1{qL>0,vL(qL)≥0}
)
+ R ≥ ξ, then for any
menu of contracts satisfying the constraints (2), profits are given by π((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) − R.
Otherwise, profits are zero. Thus, if incentivizing WoM is not more expensive than the expected
profits, the monopolist would like to pay senders just enough to make them talk. The following
lemma formalizes this intuition. Let
R∗∗((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) = max
ξ − r ·
[






24The proof in the Appendix shows that we do not need to restrict prices to be nonnegative in order to obtain this
result.
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Lemma 3 (Referral Program). Given contracts (pL, qL) and (pH , qH) satisfying (2) and vH(qH) ≥
0, the optimal referral reward is unique as long as R∗∗((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) < π((pL, qL), (pH , qH))
and is given by R∗∗((pL, qL), (pH , qH)).
Using Lemma 2 and the formula of the optimal reward function R∗∗ in Lemma 3, we can
determine whether it is optimal to offer free contracts or not, which then pins down the full optimal
menu of contracts.
In interpreting the full characterization, it is instructive to understand what the cost of offering
free contracts is. It is given by the information rent that the firm needs to pay to vH -buyers
(pertaining to the share α of the receivers) and by the cost of producing the free product (pertaining
to the share 1−α of the receivers). The following variable quantifies the overall cost of free contracts:
CF ∗ ≡ α ·vH(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
information rent
+(1− α) · c · q︸︷︷︸
production cost of free product
. (5)
Using this variable, let us first provide a heuristic argument: In order for free contracts to be
optimal, this cost has to be outweighed by the benefit generated by providing the product to low
types, i.e.,
CF ∗ ≤ (1− α)r, (6)
or equivalently CF
∗
1−α ≤ r. Notice that
CF ∗
1−α represents the “break-even externalities” necessary to
compensate for the cost of free contracts. Moreover, CF
∗
1−α is increasing in α. The average profit
generated by a receiver if free contracts are offered can be written as
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , q
∗
H)) = Π
classic − CF ∗
The following result shows that, with additional boundary conditions, (6) is also sufficient to
guarantee optimality of free contracts. We denote the set of optimal qL by Q
∗∗
L .
Lemma 4 (Free Contract). Whenever Π∗ > 0, an optimal contract to the type-L receiver must
satisfy the following:
(i) Let r ∈ [ ξ̄α ,∞). Then, Q
∗∗
L = {0} (i.e., it is not optimal to provide free contracts).
(ii) Let r ∈ [ξ̄, ξ̄α).
1. (Free contracts) q ∈ Q∗∗L if and only if
ξ − αr︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward w/o free contract
≥ CF ∗. (7)
2. (No free contracts) 0 ∈ Q∗∗L if and only if ξ − αr ≤ CF ∗.
(iii) Let r ∈ [0, ξ̄).
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1. (Free contracts) q ∈ Q∗∗L if and only if r ≥
CF ∗
1−α .
2. (No free contracts) 0 ∈ Q∗∗L if and only if r ≤
CF ∗
1−α .
The intuition for this lemma is the following. First, there is no need for the seller to provide
any incentives for WoM (i.e., qL = 0) if the cost of talking ξ is smaller than the lowest expected
externalities αr because in that case people talk anyway (Lemma 4 (i)). If r ∈ [ξ̄, ξ̄α) (Lemma 4 (ii)),
then the cost of talking is larger than αr, but free contracts can boost the expected externalities
to r ≥ ξ. Then, free contracts are used whenever the referral reward that the seller had to pay
without free contracts ξ−αr is larger than the cost of offering a free contract CF ∗ which is the sum
of the information rent and cost of producing q. Note that in this case, whenever free contracts are
offered, the optimal reward is zero by Lemma 3. Finally, for high costs of talking ξ > r (Lemma 4
(iii)), by Lemma 3 the seller pays a reward as long as the optimal reward does not exceed expected
profits. If free contracts are offered, the expected externalities can be increased by (1−α)r. Hence,
free contracts are offered only if this benefit exceeds the cost of production and the information
rent so that r ≥ CF ∗1−α as explained above.
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 pave the way for a full characterization of the optimal menu of contracts
and reward scheme summarized in the following theorem. It shows that the optimal incentive
scheme depends on the market structure given by parameters such as the cost of production c, the
externalities r, the cost of talking ξ, and the fraction of H-type receivers α.
Theorem 1 (Full Characterization). 1. (Positive profits) Π∗ > 0 if and only if
ξ < max
{
Πclassic − CF ∗ + min{r, ξ}, Πclassic + αr
}
. (8)
For the following cases, assume that (8) is satisfied:
2. (Free vs. no free contracts) There exists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , q
∗









3. (Rewards vs. no rewards)
(a) (With free contracts) If r ∈ [CF ∗1−α ,
ξ−CF ∗




H), R) ∈ S with R > 0
if and only if r < ξ, and
(b) (With no free contracts) If r 6∈ [CF ∗1−α ,
ξ−CF ∗




H), R) ∈ S with
R > 0 if and only if r < ξα .
First, it is straightforward that the monopolist should provide no incentives for WoM either
if senders talk anyway because the cost of talking is small (i.e., ξ < αr) or if it is too expensive
because the cost of talking ξ is too large relative to its benefits given in (8). A necessary condition
for free contracts to be optimal is that r is large enough (i.e., r > CF
∗
1−α ). An immediate implication
































































































(c) Mass market (α = 0.4) with c =
0.025
Figure 2: Equilibrium Regions in the (ξ, r)-space
free contracts are more effective to encourage WoM than rewards only if the cost of talking ξ is
sufficiently large relative to r (i.e., ξ > CF ∗ + αr which is derived from the upper bound of r
in part 2 of Theorem 1). Otherwise, it is cheaper to pay a small reward for talking. We discuss
comparative statics with respect to α and r in the next section.
Figure 2 illustrates the different regions in the (ξ, r)-space characterized in Theorem 1 for
vH(q) = 2
√
q, q = 20 (i.e., vH(q) ' 8.94), and for different production costs c and fraction of H-
type receivers α. The left panel shows the different regions for α = 0.2 and c = 0.05 (i.e., q∗H = 400,
p∗H = 40), while the middle panel assumes lower cost of production c = 0.025 (i.e., q
∗
H = 1600,
p∗H = 80). Comparing these two figures, one can see how low marginal cost of production c gives the
seller incentives to encourage WoM (with free contracts and/or rewards) for high costs of talking
ξ.
The rightmost panel of Figure 2 shows the different regions for a larger fraction of H-type
receivers (α = 0.4). We can think of markets with such high α as mass markets, in contrast to
niche markets with small fractions α of H-type buyers. The comparison of the two right panels
indicates that in mass markets free contracts are not optimal for relatively small externalities r and
cost of talking ξ.
3.2 Comparative Statics and Discussion
Motivated by the last observation about mass versus niche markets, here we fix ξ and analyze the
different implications for the menu of optimal contracts and reward scheme as the market size α
varies. Our model predicts a pricing pattern consistent with those that we observe in the real world.
Proposition 2 (Market Structure and Free Contracts).
(i) Consider two markets that are identical to each other except for the share of H-types, denoted





























Figure 3: Equilibrium Regions in the (α, r)-space
Π∗ > 0 in the market with α2, and α2 < α1. Then, free contracts are offered under any optimal
scheme in the market with α2.
(ii) Suppose vH(q) + r > cq. Then, α >
r−cq
vH(q)+r−cq (⇔ r <
CF ∗
1−α ) implies that free contracts are
never offered under any optimal scheme.
This proposition shows that the monopolist should encourage WoM in a market with a small
fraction α of H-type buyers as long as the market is profitable enough, i.e., Π∗∗ > 0. Intuitively,
if there are many H-types, the seller is better off paying a reward because free contracts do not
increase the probability of purchase by much. The exact trade-off is determined by the comparison
of the information rent and the per-low-type surplus r − cq that the seller can extract. The cutoff
for α is increasing in this rent while decreasing in the information rent.
Figure 3 illustrates the different regions in the (α, r)-space given the same parameters as in
Figure 2. It shows that free contracts are only optimal for small fractions α of H-buyers. However,
if there are too few H-buyers (i.e., α < 0.08 . . . ), then profits generated become too small to make
it worthwhile to encourage WoM (i.e., Π∗ = 0).26 With small externalities r, senders have little
innate benefit from WoM, so the lower bound of α above which the profit is positive is large.
These findings are consistent with the observation that digital service providers with small
production costs who successfully offer free contracts (e.g., Dropbox or Skype), have a large number
of free users. Moreover, free contracts are combined with a reward program, if the externalities are
not large (as in Dropbox: one may use it for oneself to store files and access them from multiple
computers, or share files with others), while only free contracts are offered if the externalities are
large (as in Skype: any usage generates externalities). In contrast, transportation services such
26This region disappears with heterogeneous priors as we show in the Online Appendix.
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Referral rewards Yes Yes No Yes No
Free contracts No Yes Yes No No
Profit Positive or zero Positive or zero Positive Positive Positive
Table 1: Comparative Statics with respect to r when ξ < CF1−α . The use of referral rewards and free
contracts is conditional on the firm generating positive profits.
as Amtrak or Uber that solely rely on referral rewards programs would correspond to monopolists
facing high α and low r, as many customers would be willing to pay for such services and those
services would not be subject to significant externalities.27
One might think that the smaller the externalities are, the more likely rewards are used. Figure
3 illustrates that this type of comparative statics fails for externalities. For example, at α = 0.4,
referrals are used when r = 20 but not when r = 12. The reason is that (i) when r is high, only
one of free contracts and referrals suffices to incentivize the senders, i.e., these two are substitutes,
and (ii) the cost of offering free products CF ∗ is constant across r’s while the optimal reward
monotonically decreases with r. Thus, conditional on offering free contracts being sufficient to
encourage WoM (i.e., r ≥ ξ), offering free contracts is more cost-saving for smaller r while rewards
are more cost-saving for larger r. Table 1 summarizes the different regions as functions of r for the
case in which ξ < CF1−α .
28
In the following proposition, we make the claim in (i) clearer by defining what we mean by the
two strategies being “substitutes.”
Proposition 3 (Substitutes). Referrals and free contracts are strategic substitutes as long as it is
optimal to have a referral program without free contracts, i.e.,
R∗∗((0, 0), (p1H , q
1
H)) > R
∗∗((q, 0), (p2H , q
2
H)) (9)






H) ∈ R0 × R such that (i) R∗∗((0, 0), (p1H , q1H)) < π((0, 0), (p1H , q1H)) and (ii)
both menu of contracts ((0, 0), (p1H , q
1





Intuitively, a sender is willing to talk only if the expected externalities from talking are large
enough. Thus, the monopolist can either directly pay the sender or increase the likelihood of
successful referrals by offering free contracts to L-type receivers. Put differently, free contracts
(paying the receiver) can be a substitute for reward payments (paying the sender). Note that there
are situations where it is too expensive to incentivize WoM with rewards programs only (such that
27Note that the fraction of the consumers purchasing free contracts is an endogenous variable, and one might think
that our association of observable fractions for these real products to the exogenous parameter α is not justifiable.
However, such association is justified because the map from consumer types to the choices of contracts is one-to-one
given that free contracts are used. That is, if a positive fraction of consumers purchases free contracts, then within
our model, such a fraction is exactly equal to 1− α. Yet, it may be hard to empirically test our predictions for firms
that do not offer free contracts because we do not observe α when free contracts are absent.
28If this condition is not satisfied, some regions cease existing.
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(b) α = 0.45
Figure 4: Rewards under the Optimal Scheme
R∗∗((0, 0), (pH , qH)) = 0), but the seller might benefit from a positive reward R in combination
with free contracts. In that case, (9) is not satisfied.
In order to see the implication of the substitution result on the optimal contract and reward
scheme, Figure 4 depicts the reward under the optimal menu of contracts as a function of parameters
α and r. In Figure 4-(a), there is a discontinuous upward jump at around α = 0.4. That is, at
the point where the parameter region changes from the one where both free contracts and referral
rewards are used to the one where only a referral program is used, the amount of the optimal
reward goes up. This is precisely because of the substitution effect: Because the free contracts
are dropped, the reward has to increase. Note that the same pattern appears in Figure 4-(b)
that depicts the optimal reward as a function of the externalities r. In that graph, there is a
discontinuous downward jump at around r = 8 where the parameter region changes from the one
where only a referral program is used to the one where both free contracts and referral rewards are
used.
Note that the optimal amount of reward goes down as α goes up or r goes up in the region
where only a referral program is used. This is because high α and high r means a higher expected
benefit from talking with everything else equal, so there is less need to provide a large reward. On
the other hand, the optimal reward is constant in α but decreasing in r in the region where both
free contracts and referral rewards are used. It is constant in α because the receivers will be using
the product (once informed) under provision of free contracts, so the expected benefit from talking
does not depend on α. It is decreasing in r for the same reason as for the region where only a
referral program is used.
4 Discussion
In this section we discuss various extensions and their implications, as well as the social planner’s
problem.
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4.1 Heterogeneous WoM Cost
In Section 3, we have entirely focused on homogeneous costs of talking, in order to emphasize
the core trade-off faced by a firm when encouraging senders to engage in WoM. In the Online
Appendix, we consider an extension in which different senders have different costs of talking. With
heterogeneous costs of talking, the optimal reward scheme is more complicated as it can be used to
fine-tune the amount of WoM, while with homogeneous costs either everyone or no one talks. We
analyze the optimal scheme for a fairly general class of cost distribution G, and discuss how our
results from Section 3 change. Here, we summarize the main findings of that section.
We show that the results from Section 3 are robust in the following sense. Free contracts are
not optimal for large α because in that case the benefit of free contracts given by (1− α)r is small
compared to the cost CF ∗. Referrals and free contracts remain strategic substitutes. We also show
how the homogeneous cost case can be thought of as the limit of models with heterogeneous costs.
New insights can be derived in the heterogeneous cost model with respect to the reward scheme.
The optimal reward scheme is not constant in α when a free contact is offered (as it is when the
cost of talking is homogeneous), but is increasing in α. The reason is that expected profits are
higher with higher α and hence, the seller has a stronger incentive to increase WoM. If no free
contracts are offered, in addition to the aforementioned effect, there is an opposing effect (that is
present also with homogeneous costs), as the seller only needs to pay less to senders if the expected
externalities are large in order to induce the same number of senders to talk. Thus, if no free
contracts are offered the effect of α on rewards is ambiguous, where rewards are decreasing in α if
costs are sufficiently homogeneous.
4.2 Continuous Type Space
In the model with two receiver types, the optimal scheme results in the low-type customers experi-
encing zero value from the product, a feature that may not be realistic. Our intention in the main
section was to provide the simplest model that highlights the role of free contracts as a way to
incentivize WoM, and the unrealistic feature is an artifact of the simplification, not an implication
of the effect we want to highlight. The aim of this section is to make this claim formal.
To this end, we provide an alternative model with a continuous type space and characterize
the optimal scheme. In particular, the characterization shows that under an open set of param-
eter values, conditional on a customer purchasing a free contract (which happens with positive
probability), with probability one the customer receives a strictly positive value from the product.
Formally, let us consider the same model as in the main section with a continuum of receiver
types. The receivers’ types θ are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and type θ’s valuation for quantity
q is given by
vθ(q) =
0 if q = 0θ ln (q + 1)−K if q > 0
for some constant K > 0 that is independent of θ and q. Since limq↘0 vθ(q) = −K, one can think
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of K as the fixed cost of starting to use the product. To simplify the exposition, let us assume
c < K < − ln(c) − 1 + c and c < 1. Moreover, let us define, for θ ∈ (0, 1], q(θ) = e
K
θ − 1 which
is the smallest quantity that must be offered to a type-θ receiver to make her indifferent between
using the product and not. Note that q(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1] and the receivers with θ = 0 would
not like to use the product for any q ≥ 0. For simplicity, let us also assume N = 1.
The seller solves
Π∗(ξ) = max





(pξ(θ)− qξ(θ)c) dθ −Rξ
)
(10)
where pξ ∈ R[0,1] and qξ ∈ R
[0,1]
+ are integrable functions, θξ ∈ [0, 1], and Rξ ∈ R
29 subject to the
receiver’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints which are given by
max{vθ(qξ(θ)), 0} − pξ(θ) ≥ max{vθ(qξ(θ′)), 0} − pξ(θ′) ∀θ, θ′ (θ-type’s IC)
max{vθ(qξ(θ)), 0} − pξ(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ≥ θξ (θ-type’s PC)
(11)
and the sender’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint which is given by
a1 = Refer if and only if ξ ≤ r(1− θξ) +Rξ. (12)
Define a strengthening of the constraint (12) by imposing a condition that the sender must talk,
i.e.,
a1 = Refer holds and ξ ≤ r(1− θξ) +Rξ. (12’)
We denote by Π̃(ξ) the optimal profit of the problem (10) subject to (11) and (12’).
In order to characterize the optimal scheme, we first define several notations. First, the appendix
shows that, for ξ = 0, there exists a unique (up to measure-zero set of θ) solution to (10) subject
to (11) and (12’), which satisfies
q∗0(θ) :=



















−K + c = 0.










−K + c+ r ≤ 0, (14)
29Note that an analogous result to Lemma 1 holds in this setup.
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−K+ c+ r = 0, which always
exists.
Proposition 4. Let ξ > 0.
(i) Whenever Π̃(ξ) > 0, there exists a unique solution (up to measure-zero set of types)30 to the
problem (10) subject to (11) and (12), and it is a solution to (10) subject to (11) and (12’).
(ii) There is a unique solution (up to measure-zero set of types) to the problem (10) subject to (11)
and (12’) given by (p∗ξ(·), q∗ξ (·), θ
∗
ξ
, R∗ξ). It has the following properties:
1. If ξ < r(1− θ∗
0
), then neither a free contract nor reward is offered, i.e., p∗ξ(θ) > 0 if and only
if q∗ξ (θ) > 0, and R
∗
ξ = 0. Moreover, q
∗






2. Suppose r(1− θ∗
0
) ≤ ξ.
(a) If (14) is satisfied, then the following hold.
i. No free contract is offered, i.e., p∗ξ(θ) > 0, if and only if q
∗
ξ (θ) > 0.
ii. q∗ξ (θ) = q
∗∗(θ) for θ ≥ θ∗
ξ




iv. A positive reward is offered, i.e., R∗ξ = ξ−r(1−θ
∗
ξ
) > 0, if and only if ξ > r(1−θ′′).
(b) If (14) is not satisfied, then there exists a θξ > θ
′ such that the following hold.31
i. For θ > θξ, no free contract is offered, i.e., p
∗
ξ(θ) > 0. For θ ∈ [θ
∗
ξ
, θξ], a free
contract is offered, i.e., p∗ξ(θ) = 0. Otherwise, p
∗
ξ(θ) = 0.
ii. q∗ξ (θ) = q
∗∗(θ) for θ > θξ, q
∗
ξ (θ) = q(θ
∗
ξ
) for θ ∈ [θ∗
ξ
, θξ], and q
∗




iv. A positive reward is offered, i.e., R∗ξ = ξ−r(1−θ
∗
ξ
) > 0, if and only if ξ > r(1−θ∗
ξ
).
The proposition highlights that, as in the two-type case that we consider in the main analysis,
the optimal scheme exhibits a rich pattern of the use of free contracts and referral rewards. In
particular, it allows for the parameter regions such that both are used, only free contracts are
used, only referral rewards are used, and none are used. To see our main point about the size of
the surplus the receiver purchasing a free contract experiences, first note that a free contract is
offered under an open set of parameter values because it is offered whenever r(1 − θ∗) ≤ ξ holds
and (14) is not satisfied, and those conditions hold (case 2b of Proposition 4) for an open set of
parameter values. Second, whenever a free contract (q(θ∗
ξ
), 0) is offered, it is purchased with a
positive probability as all types [θ
ξ
, θξ] purchase that contract and θξ < θξ, but everyone but θξ
receives strictly positive surplus vθ(q(θξ)) from it.
30It is not payoff-relevant for the firm if for a zero-mass of types a different contract satisfying the constraints is
offered.








In the main analysis we assumed that only the senders receive externalities, and claimed that even
if we assumed the receivers would receive externalities as well, the essence of the analysis would
not change. The goal of this subsection is to make this formal. Consider a model as in Section 2,
with an additional feature that if receiver i uses the product, she receives externalities r. In this
model, for each θ ∈ {H,L}, if a type-θ receiver uses quantity q, she experiences utility vθ(q) + r.
Note that this is a change that shifts the valuation functions by a constant, i.e., they change
from vθ(q) to vθ(q) + r for each θ = H,L. Hence, it does not alter the nature of the optimal
contract scheme under each fixed r, assuming that our restrictions are met for the new valuation
functions. This implies that all comparative statics with respect to parameters that are not r (e.g.,
Proposition 2) are robust. Below we show that our main comparative statics with respect to r
(provided in Theorem 1) goes through as well.32








is met. Then, the use of rewards is determined by conditions given by the
bounds independent of the size of r (the conditions are r < ξ in the presence of free contracts and
r < ξα otherwise, and ξ and
ξ
α do not depend on r). It is immediate that the same characterization
goes through in our modified model, but now the size of CF ∗ depends on r. If we show that CF ∗
is nonincreasing and CF ∗ + αr is nondecreasing in r, then the region of r such that free contracts
are used is still given by a convex interval, guaranteeing that the essence of the comparative statics
does not change. We first show that CF ∗ is strictly decreasing in r. To show this, let us write
down the modified CF ∗ as follows:
CF ∗(r) = α(vH(q(r)) + r) + (1− α)cq(r),
where CF ∗(r) and q(r) denote the cost of free contracts under r and the break-even quantity for
low-types under r (i.e., vL(q(r)) + r = 0), respectively. It is immediate that the second term is
strictly decreasing in r because v′L(q) is strictly increasing in q and thus q(r) is strictly decreasing
in r. The first term is strictly decreasing in r for the following reason: Take r and r′ with r < r′.
Then, by the assumption that v′H(q) > v
′
L(q) and the definition of the q(·) function, it must be the
case that:
(vH(q(r









+ (r′− r) = 0
Overall, CF ∗(r) is strictly decreasing in r. We next show that CF ∗(r) + αr is strictly increasing





α c for all q > 0. That is, the marginal values of the two types are not
too different from each other, which ensures that the information rent vH(q(r)) does not vary
too much with r. Then, taking the first-order condition of CF ∗ with respect to r and by noting
32We keep assuming that our restrictions are satisfied after the shifts of the valuation functions.
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q′(r) = − 1
v′L(q(r))
(by the Implicit Function Theorem), one can show that CF ∗(r) + αr is strictly
increasing in r. All in all, free contracts are used if and only if r is in a convex interval.
Note that this analysis provides an interesting observation that the cost of free contracts de-
creases in the size of externalities because both the production cost and the information rent
decrease. The reason is that if low types receive externalities it becomes easier for the firm to make
them willing to use the product (implying low production cost) and high types have less incentives
to switch to the low-type contract at such a level of quantity provided to low types (implying lower
information rent).
To sum up, the model of two-sided externalities provides qualitatively equivalent comparative
statics as our main model with one-sided externalities.
4.4 Quantity-Dependent Externalities
The main analysis is based on a model in which the magnitude of externalities is captured by a
single parameter r. As Theorem 1 shows, this is the key parameter that determines the optimal
scheme. However, one can imagine that a Dropbox user who wants to refer his co-author receives
higher positive externalities from joint usage if the co-author uses Dropbox more. The objective
of this section is to formalize the idea of quantity-dependent externalities and discuss how such
dependencies affect our predictions.
To this end, consider a function r̄ : R+ → R+ that assigns to each quantity level consumed the
value of externalities generated. We employ the normalization that r̄(0) = 0. Note that our main
model corresponds to the case in which r̄(q) = r for all q > 0. In this section we assume that r̄ is
differentiable, strictly concave, r̄′(q) > 0 for all q ≥ 0 and limq→∞ r̄′(q) = 0.








). Then, the L-type’s PC constraint and the H-
type’s IC constraint must be binding. First, consider the case when the sender’s IC constraint is
binding. In that case, (generically) positive rewards are being paid. Then, if a contract is offered to
the low types (q̄∗L > 0), then the optimal scheme must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
α(v′H(q̄
∗
H)− c+ r̄′(q̄∗H)) = 0
and q∗L ∈ {0, q} (as in the main model) if
(1− α)(v′L(qL)− c+ r̄′(qL)) + α(v′L(qL)− v′H(qL)) < 0 (15)
holds for qL = q, and q
∗
L satisfies the above inequality with equality otherwise.
33 For simplicity, we
focus the discussion on the case when the inequality in (15) is satisfied for qL = q.
Otherwise, the contract has a positive price. If low types are not served under the optimal
contract scheme, then only the first-order condition for q∗H need be satisfied. Thus, as in the
main model, there are only three possible levels of realized externalities corresponding to the three
33The solution exists and is unique as we assume r̄ is strictly concave and the limit of its slope is zero.
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contracts that the firm optimally chooses conditional on rewards being paid, r̄(q̄∗H) =: rH , r̄(q) =: rL
and r̄(0) = 0. Note that in this case, q∗H ≤ q̄∗H holds because r̄′(q̄∗H) > 0 and v′H is decreasing.
If the sender’s IC constraint is not binding, then the sender’s IC can be ignored and thus, the
optimal contract is the same as in the main model, and in particular, q̄∗H = q
∗
H . Let us denote the
externalities received if the high type’s contract is purchased by rh := r̄(q
∗
H).
Here we consider how the conditions for offering free contracts change. In the absence of free
contracts, expected externalities are given by αrH , while in the presence of free contracts, expected
externalities are given by αrH + (1 − α)rL. Now, consider part 2 of Theorem 1. It says that, for
free contracts to be used in the optimal scheme, two conditions have to be met: r(1 − α) ≥ CF ∗
and ξ − αr ≥ CF ∗. The first inequality says that the cost of free contracts has to be no more
than the increment of the expected externalities. The second says that it has to be no more than
the rewards necessary to be paid to compensate for the difference between the cost of talking and
the externalities that are generated anyway by high types, in the absence of free contracts. Since
the first inequality automatically holds when the sender’s IC constraint does not bind, and the
second inequality automatically holds when the sender’s IC constraint binds, these conditions can
be rewritten as:
rL(1− α) ≥ CF ∗ and ξ − αrh ≥ CF ∗.
Since CF ∗ is unchanged, these conditions imply that low externalities for low types and high
externalities for high types both reduce the set of parameters for which free contracts are optimally
offered. Thus, free contracts can be optimal only if the dependence of the magnitude of externalities
does not vary too much with the quantity consumed by the receivers. Our main analysis corresponds
to the (extreme) case with constant r̄ functions, and hence best captures the role of free contracts.
4.5 Informed Senders
To simplify the analysis, in the main analysis we assume that each sender has the same information
about the type of his receiver as the firm. However, in some markets one can imagine that senders
have better information about their friends’ willingness to pay than the firm. The objective of
this section is to consider a model that accommodates this possibility, and to discuss robustness of
and difference from the results of the main analysis. Specifically, let us assume that each sender
independently observes a signal s ∈ {sL, sH} about his receiver. If the receiver’s type is θ = H,





, and if the receiver’s type is θ = L, the
sender sees a signal s = sH with probability 1−β.34 Thus, by Bayes rule, a sender who has received
a signal sH believes that the probability of facing a H-type receiver is αH =
αβ
αβ+(1−α)(1−β)(> α),
while a sender who has received a signal sL instead believes that the probability of facing a H-type
receiver is αL =
α(1−β)
α(1−β)+(1−α)β (< α).
How does the firm’s optimization problem change? The firm’s objective function is a weighted
sum of the profit generated by WoM of senders who have received a high signal and the profit
34If β = 1
2
was the case, then senders and the firm would have exactly the same information about receivers. Our
main model corresponds to this case.
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generated by WoM of senders who have received a low signal. The two profit functions are as in
(1) with the fraction of high valuation receivers being αH and αL, respectively. More precisely, a
fraction αβ + (1 − α)(1 − β) of senders have received a high signal sH and the expected profits
generated by those senders is just (1) with the fraction of H-type receivers being αH . A fraction
α(1− β) + (1− α)β of senders has received a low signal and the profit generated by those senders
is (1) with the fraction of H-type receivers being αL. Note that the receivers’ constraints remain
unchanged. However, the firm now faces two IC constraints for the senders - one for the senders
who observed sH and one for the senders who observed sL.
An important difference to the model we consider in the main part is that Lemma 1 is not valid
anymore as the firm can utilize the informational differences with the reward scheme.
Proposition 5 (Rewards with informed senders). 1. Suppose that all senders choose “Refer”
under the optimal scheme.
(a) If the firm does not offer free contracts, then the optimal reward scheme R satisfies
R(H) ≤ R(L) with the inequality being strict if r ∈ (0, ξαL ).
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(b) If the firm offers free contracts, then the optimal reward scheme R satisfies R(H) =
R(L) = max{ξ − r, 0}.
2. Suppose that senders who received sH choose “Refer” but other senders choose “Not” under
the optimal scheme.
(a) If the firm does not offer free contracts, then there exists an optimal reward scheme
R such that R(H) > R(L) = 0. Moreover, any optimal reward scheme R satisfies
R(H) > R(L)− r.
(b) If the firm offers free contracts, then there exists an optimal reward scheme R such that
R(H) > R(L) = 0. Moreover, any optimal reward scheme R satisfies R(H) > R(L).
Each of the four cases arises given a nonempty parameter region that we compute in the proof
of Proposition 6 in the Appendix. An important implication of this proposition is that, if the firm
wants to incentivize all senders to talk, then she must pay more for referrals of L-type receivers
than for H-type receivers because L-type senders’ expected externalities are low. In contrast, if the
firm is better off excluding senders who received signal sL, then one optimal scheme only rewards
referrals of premium users. Note that if the firm wants to induce sL-senders to talk, it should also
induce sH -senders to talk because it is cheaper to provide incentives to sH -senders and they talk
to a better pool of receivers.
Solving the full problem is a daunting task because there are multiple cases to analyze depending
on which type of senders are encouraged to talk. If the monopolist decides to encourage every sender
to talk, the choice between free contracts and referral rewards can be tricky: offering free contracts
can be very attractive in a market with fraction αL of high types but not attractive in a market






for ξ < r.
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with fraction αH of high types. As the firm cannot differentiate between buyers who have generated
a high signal versus a low signal, it needs to trade off the benefits in both markets when deciding
whether to offer free contracts. One can, however, easily derive the following results for the extreme
cases:
Proposition 6 (Signal strength). 1. If ξ − r < α(p∗H − cq∗H), then there exists β̄ < 1 such that
for all β > β̄, the unique optimal menu of contracts is given by ((0, 0), (p∗H , q
∗
H)), and there
exists an optimal reward scheme R, which satisfies R(L) = 0. If ξ − r ≥ α(p∗H − cq∗H), then
for any β ∈ (12 , 1), the firm cannot make positive profits.
2. Suppose that there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts ((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) in the model









, there exists β̄ > 12 such that for all
β ∈ (12 , β̄), there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts and it is ((pL, qL), (pH , qH)).
Part 1 shows that, if the signal strength β is too large, free contracts are not used by the seller.
Part 2 then shows that the model we analyze in the main section without signals is reasonable
when we think of the introduction of a new product category because in such a case β would be
close to 12 .
4.6 Multiple Senders per Receiver
In the main model, we consider a stylized network structure between senders and receivers, i.e.,
receiver i is connected only to sender i, and vice versa. In reality, however, it is possible that
a receiver is connected to multiple potential senders of the same information. Similarly to the
discussion in the Online Appendix where the receiver can learn from an advertisement, a receiver
has multiple sources of information if there are multiple senders. Such a situation can arise when
senders and receivers are connected through a general network structure.
In this section we discuss how the predictions change when there are multiple senders per
receiver. To make our point as clear as possible, let us assume that once a receiver adopts a
product, each sender who talked to the receiver experiences the same externalities of r. That is, if
there are m senders for a given receiver, then the total externalities generated by the receiver are
mr. The reward can be conditioned on the set of senders who talked.
Let m > 1 be the number of senders connected to a given receiver. Suppose that, when there
is only one sender, R is the optimal expected referral reward. The conclusion in Lemma 1 (or the
analysis in the Online Appendix on advertising) entails that, by paying R in expectation to each
sender, the firm can give the same incentive of talking to the senders. However, such an adjustment
changes the firm’s total payment. This is because the expected payment of referral reward is no
longer R, but mR.
This implies that the firm becomes reluctant to use referral rewards. More precisely, if the
optimal reward level is zero in the model with one sender per receiver, then it is still zero in the
model with multiple senders per receiver. At the same time, free contracts become relatively more
attractive as it incentivizes senders in the same way as with only one sender. Thus, when there are
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multiple senders per receiver, the range of parameter values such that only free contracts are used
becomes wider because free contracts can substitute referral rewards.
4.7 Social Optimum
In order to understand the monopolist’s strategy better, we consider the social planner’s solution
and compare it with the solution obtained in the main section. Specifically, we consider a social
planner who has control over the senders’ actions ai ∈ {Refer,Not} and the quantities qL and qH
offered to receivers, while she does not have control over receivers’ choice of whether to actually
use the product after it is allocated.36 Rewards and prices do not show up in the social planner’s
problem because they are only transfers between agents.
We start with two basic observations. First, whenever WoM takes place under the monopolist’s
solution, there is a surplus from WoM. Hence, it is also in the social planner’s interest to encourage
WoM. Second, under the monopolist’s optimal scheme, free contracts always make senders weakly
better off by increasing the probability of receiving externalities, high-type receivers better off
by reducing the price due to the information rent, and low-type receivers indifferent because their
participation constraint is always binding. This implies that, if the monopolist firm optimally offers
free contracts, then it is also socially optimal to offer it. We summarize these two observations in
the following proposition:
Proposition 7. 1. If there exists a monopolist’s solution under which ai = Refer for all i, then
there exists a social planner’s solution that entails ai = Refer for all i.
2. If there exists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , q
∗
H), R) ∈ S for some R under the monopolist’s solution, then there
exists a social planner’s solution that entails qL = q.
The converse of each part of the above proposition is not necessarily true, i.e., the monopolist
may be less willing to encourage WoM than the social planner or not offer free contracts despite
it being socially optimal. To see this clearly, we further investigate the social planner’s problem in
what follows.
Conditional on free contracts being offered, the welfare-maximizing menu of quantities (qH , qL)
is exactly the same as the menu offered by the monopolist in the main section. To see why, first
note that, as in the classic screening problem in Maskin and Riley (1984), the monopolist’s solution
results in no distortions at the top, i.e., v′(qH) = c. Conditional on selling to the low types, the
low-type quantity qL under the second best in Maskin and Riley (1984) is distorted to deter high
types to switch to the contract offered to low types. This means that the social planner’s solution
dictates that low types receive more quantity in the first best than in the second best. In our
problem, however, the welfare-maximizing quantity cannot be strictly higher than q because the
36In the classic setup of Maskin and Riley (1984), all buyers get positive utility from using the product, and thus,
they always use the product after purchase. If we were to allow the social planner to have control over the use of the
product and v′L(q) < c for all q > 0, then she would have low types use just a little bit of the quantity and generate
the externalities r, which we view as implausible.
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Figure 5: Socially optimal WoM in the (α, r)-space: Under the social optimum, (i) the senders
engage in WoM if and only if the parameters fall in the colored parameter region, and (ii) free
contracts are used if and only if the parameters fall in the top-right region tagged as “free contract.”
The background displays the monopolist’s solution as presented in Figure 3.
marginal cost c is higher than the marginal benefit v′L(q) for all q ≥ q (Assumption 2), and the
incentive-compatible quantity cannot be strictly lower than q because the low types would not use
the product for qL < q.
Finally, whether or not the sender talks under the social planner’s solution depends on the
comparison between the total benefit from talking and the cost of talking, ξ: In total, WoM is
efficient if and only if
α(vH(q
∗
H)− cq∗H + r) + (1− α) max{r − cq, 0} ≥ ξ. (16)
Note that there are two social benefits of WoM. First, WoM creates network externalities because
the senders and receivers become aware of each other using the product. Second, it creates gains
from trade because some high-valuation buyers learn about the product. Figure 5 summarizes the
above findings using the same parameters as in Figure 3.
In the monopolist’s solution, free contracts are not used if r < CF
∗
1−α . Substituting the definition
of CF ∗ shows that this is equivalent to r − cq < α1−αvH(q). Since the social planner uses free
contracts if 0 < r− cq, the monopolist uses free contracts too little from the social planner’s point
of view conditional on it being socially optimal to encourage WoM if r is high, and α or vH(q) is
high. The reason is as follows. On the one hand, high externalities r imply a high additional benefit
r from having a receiver using the product, so that the social planner wants all receivers to use
the product. However, such r pertains to the senders and the monopolist cannot extract the entire
corresponding surplus. On the other hand, the monopolist is reluctant to use free contracts if the
information rent necessary to induce high types to purchase a premium contracts is high relative
to the number of low types who choose the free contracts. The “per low-type” information rent
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α
1−αvH(q) is high if α or vH(q) is high.
4.8 No Price Discrimination and First-Degree Price Discrimination
In this section we consider two alternative models of WoM.37 These models are simpler than our
main model, and we will show that they result in similar characterizations of the optimal scheme.
The objective of discussing those models is to show the robustness of our results highlight key
assumptions in our model, and discuss rationales for our modeling choice.
In the two models we discuss below, assume that each receiver has unit demand, and fraction
α ∈ (0, 1) of high-type receivers value the product at v > 0, and fraction 1−α of low-type receivers
value the product at 0. Each unit of the product costs c to the firm. We allow for both positive
and negative marginal cost, so c ∈ R. We assume v > c, so there is a strictly positive surplus from
high-type receivers.
First, suppose that the firm cannot price-discriminate. The firm chooses a single price and
an amount of the referral reward. Assume that −c < α(v − c). Thus if ξ = 0 and thus senders
talk without being incentivized, then pricing at 0 is not optimal. Call this model the no-price-
discrimination model.
The optimal price is either 0 or v. If the price is 0, then the firm’s (per-receiver expected)
profits are given by
max
R
−c−R s.t. ξ ≤ R+ r.
The optimal profit is −c if r ≥ ξ and −c− (ξ−r) otherwise. That is, it is −c−min{ξ−r, 0}. Thus,
in order for free contracts to be used in the optimal scheme, it is necessary that c < 0.
If the price is v, then the firm’s (per-receiver expected) profits are given by
max
R
α(v − c)−R s.t. ξ ≤ R+ αr.
The optimal profit is α(v − c)−min{ξ − αr, 0}.
Define the cost of free contract by CFnpd = αv+ (1−α)c. This is an analogue of CF ∗ that we
defined in the main model because, due to the restriction that only a single price can be provided,
high types receive the surplus of v when the price is 0. Let Πclassic-npd = α(v − c).
Proposition 8 (No-Price-Discrimination Model). In the no-price-discrimination model, the fol-
lowing are true.
1. (Positive profits) The firm’s profits are strictly positive if and only if
ξ < max
{
Πclassic-npd − CFnpd + min{r, ξ}, Πclassic-npd + αr
}
. (17)
For the following cases, assume that (17) is satisfied:
37We thank a referee of this journal for suggesting those two models.
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3. (Rewards vs. no rewards)
(a) (With free contracts) If r ∈ [CFnpd1−α ,
ξ−CFnpd
α ], then there exists an optimal scheme
with price 0 with a strictly positive reward if and only if r < ξ, and
(b) (With no free contracts) If r 6∈ [CFnpd1−α ,
ξ−CFnpd
α ], then there exists an optimal scheme
with price v with a strictly positive reward if and only if r < ξα .
Note that this result is parallel to Theorem 1, where we replace CF ∗ and Πclassic with CFnpd
and Πclassic-npd, respectively.
Second, suppose that the firm can engage in the first-degree price discrimination. That is, the
firm knows the type of each receiver. The optimal pricing strategy is either (i) to set the price at
v for high types and 0 for low types, or (ii) to set price at v for high types and a strictly positive
price for low types. In the first case, the firm’s (per-receiver expected) profits are given by
max
R
αv − c−R s.t. ξ ≤ R+ r.
The optimal profit is v − c−min{ξ − r, 0}.
In the second case, the firm’s (per-receiver expected) profits are given by
max
R
α(v − c)−R s.t. ξ ≤ R+ αr.
The optimal profit is α(v−c)−min{ξ−αr, 0}. Define the cost of free contract by CF 1d = (1−α)c.
This is again an analogue of CF ∗ because, due to the assumption that the firm knows the receiver
type, no information rent is necessary to be subtracted from the price offer to high types. Let
Πclassic-1d = α(v − c). Again we obtain a result parallel to Theorem 1.
Proposition 9 (First-Degree Price-Discrimination Model). In the no-price-discrimination model,
the following are true.
1. (Positive profits) The firm’s profits are strictly positive if and only if
ξ < max
{
Πclassic-1d − CF 1d + min{r, ξ}, Πclassic-1d + αr
}
. (18)
For the following cases, assume that (18) is satisfied:
2. (Free vs. no free contracts) There exists an optimal scheme in which the price is set at








3. (Rewards vs. no rewards)
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(a) (With free contracts) If r ∈ [CF 1d1−α ,
ξ−CF 1d
α ], then there exists an optimal scheme in
which the price is set at 0 for some customers and a strictly positive reward is provided
if and only if r < ξ, and
(b) (With no free contracts) If r 6∈ [CF 1d1−α ,
ξ−CF 1d
α ], then there exists an optimal scheme
in which the price is set at 0 for no customers and a strictly positive reward is provided
if and only if r < ξα .
Although these models are simpler and imply similar results to the ones for our main model, we
did not make them our base model for the following four reasons. First, although the setups of the
models look simpler, the results and the analyses are as complicated as those of our main models
(we need to conduct parallel calculations to show the above two propositions), so the simplicity of
the model does not help. Second, in the applications we have in mind such as Dropbox and Skype,
it is difficult to imagine that the firm is restricted to offer a single price, or it perfectly knows the
customer type. Third, the nature of the models that are necessary to imply the desired results may
not fit the applications we have in mind. For the no-price-discrimination model, it is necessary
for the marginal cost to be strictly negative. Such negative marginal costs may be relevant when
each unit of sales is associated with advertising revenue, but no companies that we consider rely
on advertising. For the first-degree price-discrimination model, it is simpler because the firm has
a perfect knowledge about the receiver type. In order for free contracts to be useful as a tool to
incentivize WoM, however, we need at least some imperfectness of the sender’s knowledge about
the receiver type. These two things imply that senders have less knowledge about the receivers
than the firm does. This is an unlikely situation, at least in our applications. Fourth, the value of
the product to the low types are exogenously set at zero in those models, but in our main model
the firm chooses the quantity of the model and as a result, the value is endogenously set at zero.
5 Conclusion
The case of Dropbox shows that WoM plays an important role in customer acquisition. This paper
is the first to incorporate WoM in a contracting problem. We jointly analyzed the role of a freemium
strategy and referral rewards when incentivizing WoM for products with positive externalities.
We present a model of optimal contracting in which the number of customers depends on
WoM. The monopolist firm optimally encourages senders of the information to engage in WoM by
fine-tuning two parts of the benefit of talking: referral rewards and expected externalities.
Despite being very simple, the model allows for a rich set of predictions. The key takeaways
can be summarized as follows.
1. In general, the use of referral rewards and free contracts depend on the environment. It can
be optimal to use one, both or none of these methods.
2. It is optimal to use referral programs when the size of externalities is small.
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3. It is optimal to use free versions only when there are many low-type customers.
4. Referral rewards and free contracts substitute each other.
5. The pattern of the optimal scheme is consistent with the strategies we observe for companies
such as Dropbox, Skype, Uber, and Amtrak.
We keep our model particularly simple and there are many ways to enrich it. We have enu-
merated potential reasons for the use of free products in Section 1.1, and it would be interesting
to build a model that includes those effects as well. In such extensions, the findings in this paper
would be helpful in identifying the implications of those additional effects. For example, we could
enrich a model to have the receivers take a role of the senders once they are informed. This can
be done in either a diffusion-type model in which the penetration takes place over time, or in a
stationary environment in which the population size is constant through time. Possible challenges
in such models are that, when a customer decides whether to adopt the product, she not only
considers the price and quantity (as in the receiver in our model), but also the future benefit from
talking as a sender. In turn, the sender deciding whether to talk has to take into account this
tradeoff of the receiver.
Another extension of interest is the one in which receivers are uncertain about the quality of the
product, and the senders have higher incentives to talk when they know the quality is higher. In
such a model, if the receivers know that the senders would receive referral rewards, then they may
adjust their belief about the quality downwards. Although this may be a worthwhile direction to
extend the model, it would require too much divergence from the Maskin-Riley model, and hence
is outside the scope of the current paper.
Finally, our work suggests possibilities of empirical research. It may help estimate the value of
externalities that the senders perceive upon referring. We hope our paper stimulates a sequence of
such research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) As discussed in footnote 21, we prove the result for a general environment
in which, after each sender i sees the menu of contrast, he privately observes his cost of talking
ξi, drawn from an independent and identical distribution with a cumulative distribution function
G : R+ → [0, 1] that has at most finitely many jumps. With this formulation, the present proof
shows that the existence result is also valid for the general setup discussed in the Online Appendix.
First, we show that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to choice variables in
a compact set. To see this, first note that, as we will show in the proof of Lemma 2, a scheme
((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) with qL ∈ (0, q) generates a strictly lower profit than a scheme ((pL, 0), (pH , qH), R).
The same proof also shows that a scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) with qL > q generates a strictly
lower profit than a scheme ((pL, q), (pH , qH), R). Thus it is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to {0, q} as the space from which qL is chosen. This and the participation constraint for
low types imply that if a scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) satisfies the constraints then pL ≤ 0. Also,
the proof for Lemma 2 shows that for any scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R), pL < 0 implies that the
participation constraints for both types are non-binding, hence there exists ε > 0 such that there
exists a scheme ((pL + ε, qL), (pH + ε, qH), R) that satisfies the constraints and generates a higher
profit than the original scheme. Consequently, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to a scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) with pL = 0.
Also, since limq→∞ v
′
H(q) < c, there exists q
′ such that any scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) with
qH > q
′ generates a strictly negative profit. Thus it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to [0, q′] for the space for qH , where q
′ is any number satisfying v′H(q
′) < c. Fix such q′ < ∞
arbitrarily. Then, any scheme ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) with R > vH(q
′) generates a strictly negative
profit, so again it is without loss to restrict attention to [0, vH(q
′)] as the space for R.
These bounds for qH and qL together with the PC constraints imply that it is without loss of
generality to consider pH ≤ vH(q′). The incentive compatibility condition for low types implies
that 0 = max{vL(qL), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL(qH), 0} − pH , which implies pH ≥ max{vL(qH), 0} ≥ 0.
Thus, it is without loss of generality to consider pH ∈ [0, vH(q′)].
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These facts and the fact that all constraints are weak inequalities with continuous functions
imply that the optimal scheme is chosen from a compact set. Now, note that the objective function
is right-continuous in each choice variable because G is a cumulative distribution function, and all
jumps are upwards.
These facts and the assumption that G has only finitely many discontinuities imply that there
exists a partition of the compact space of the choice variables C with a finite number of cells
(P1, . . . , PK) for some integer K ∈ N, such that over each cell, the objective function is continuous.
Let π̂ be the supremum of the objective function over C. Then there exists a sequence (yk)k=1,2,...
with yk ∈ C for all k such that the value of the objective function under yk converges to π̂. Since
K <∞, this implies that there exists a cell of the partition, denoted Pi∗ (choose one arbitrarily if
there are multiples of such cells), and a subsequence (zk)k=1,2,... of (y
k)k=1,2,... such that z
k ∈ Pi∗
for all k.
Since Pi∗ is a bounded set, (z
k)k=1,2,... has an accumulation point. Let an arbitrary choice of an
accumulation point be z∗. If z∗ ∈ Pi∗ , then by continuity the objective function attains the value
π̂ at z∗. If z∗ 6∈ Pi∗ , then by the assumption of the upward jumps, the objective function attains
the value strictly greater than π̂ at z∗, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Proof. (Lemma 2) Let ((pL, qL), (pH , qH), R) be an optimal scheme.
(i) Given a menu of contracts with qL > q that satisfy (2), continuity of vL implies that
the monopolist can decrease qL and pL slightly, such that max{vL(qL), 0} − pL remains constant
(by Assumption 1) without violating (2) because vH(qL) − pL decreases with such a change (as
v′H > v
′
L). This strictly increases profits by Assumption 2. Similarly, given a menu of contracts
with 0 < qL < q that satisfy (2) and such that Π
∗ > 0, the monopolist can decrease qL to zero and
increase profits without violating (2).
The equation pL = 0 can be shown by noting that type L’s participation constraint must be
binding: Assume pL < max{vL(qL), 0} = 0. First, note that then type H’s participation constraint
cannot be binding: If it was, then
0 = max{vH(qH), 0} − pH ≥ max{vH(qL), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL(qL), 0} − pL > 0
which is a contradiction. Thus, the monopolist can strictly increase profits by increasing pL
and pH by the same small amount such that (2) remains to be satisfied. Consequently, pL =
max{vL(qL), 0} = 0.
(ii) Given aR, pL = 0 and fixing qL ∈ {0, q}, H-type’s contract (pH , qH) must solve maxpH ,qH α(pH−
qHc) subject to max{vH(qH), 0} − pH ≥ max{vH(qL), 0} and max{vH(qH), 0} − pH ≥ 0. If we
ignored the participation constraint, and solved a relaxed problem, the incentive compatibility con-
straint must be binding and it follows that qH = q
∗
H and pH = max{vH(q∗H), 0} −max{vH(qL), 0}.
This automatically satisfies the participation constraint:
max{vH(q∗H), 0} − [max{vH(q∗H), 0} −max{vH(qL), 0}] = max{vH(qL), 0} > max{vL(qL), 0} = 0.
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The above proof shows that IC constraint of the H-type is binding. Using this fact, parts (iii) and
(iv) follow by plugging qL into type-H’s incentive compatibility constraint.
Proof. (Lemma 3, Referral Program) A sender talks if and only if
ξ ≤ r
(
α+ (1− α) · 1{qL>0,vL(qL)≥0}
)
+R.
As a result, the monopolist must pay at least (4) in order to assure that senders talk and thus,
the monopolist pays exactly this as long as it is profitable to inform receivers, i.e., as long as
R∗∗((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) < π((pL, qL), (pH , qH)) holds.
Proof. (Lemma 4, Free Contracts) (i) If ξ ≤ αr, then the senders’ IC constraint is always





α · (pH − qH · c) + (1− α) · (pL − qL · c)−R
]
which is equivalent to the maximization problem in the benchmark case with free WoM. Thus, no
free contracts are offered under any optimal scheme.
(ii) First, note that if Π∗ > 0, it suffices to show when profits with free contracts (and the
optimal reward scheme given by Lemma 3) are greater than profits without free contracts.
Let αr < ξ ≤ r. First, if ξ − αr > Πclassic, then by Lemma 3, not offering free contracts yields
negative profits and cannot be optimal. If ξ − αr ≤ Πclassic, then by Lemma 3, the optimal reward
is R = 0 whenever qL = q and is R = ξ − αr whenever qL = 0. With pL = 0 and (pH , qH) as in
Lemma 2, it follows immediately that offering free contracts generates weakly higher profits than
offering qL = 0 if and only if Π
classic−αvH(q)− (1−α) ·q ·c ≥ Πclassic− (ξ−αr), which is equivalent
to (7).
(iii) Let ξ > r. Then, by Lemma 3 if the monopolist chooses qL = q, then profits are given
by Πclassic − CF ∗ − (ξ − r) and if qL = 0, then profits are given by Πclassic − (ξ − αr). Thus,
offering free contracts generates a weakly higher profit than offering no free contracts if and only if
Πclassic − CF ∗ − (ξ − r) ≥ Πclassic − (ξ − αr), which is equivalent to CF ∗ ≤ (1− α)r.
Proof. (Theorem 1, Full Characterization) 1. By Lemmas 2 and 3, Π∗ > 0 if and only if
Πclassic − CF ∗ −max{ξ − r, 0} > 0 or Πclassic −max{ξ − αr, 0} > 0. Since Πclassic > 0, this can be
rewritten as Πclassic − CF ∗ −max{ξ − r, 0} > 0 or Πclassic − (ξ − αr) > 0.
2. This follows immediately from Lemma 4.
3. (a) By Lemma 3, in the presence of free contracts, a reward must only be paid if r > ξ.
(b) Similarly, if no free contracts are offered, positive rewards are only being paid if αr < ξ.
Proof. (Proposition 2) (i) Denote the maximal expected profit without free contracts (i.e., qL = 0
is offered to low types) under α by Πnot free(α). Similarly, denote the maximal expected profit with
free contracts under α by Πfree(α).38 The function Πnot free(α) is concave as long as Πnot free(α) > 0,
38Existence of these maxima follows from an analogous proof to the one for Proposition 1.
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α(p∗H − q∗Hc− vH(q))− (1− α)qc−max{ξ − r, 0}
< lim
α→1
α(p∗H − q∗Hc)−max{ξ − αr, 0} = Πnot free(α).
This implies that Πnot free(α) and Πfree(α) intersect at most once. Hence, if Πfree(α1) ≥ Πnot free(α1),
then Πfree(α2) > Π
not free(α2) for all α2 < α1. This concludes the proof.
(ii) This part follows directly from part 2 of Theorem 1.
Proof. (Proposition 3) By Lemma 3, we have
R∗∗((0, 0), (p1H , q
1
H)) = max{ξ − αr, 0} > max{ξ − r, 0} ≥ R∗∗((0, q), (p2H , q2H))
because R∗∗((0, 0), (p1H , q
1




H)) and ξ − αr > 0.
Proof. (Proposition 4) Part (i) is straightforward, so we prove part (ii). Fix a solution to the
problem (10) subject to (11) and (12’) and denote it by (p∗ξ(·), q∗ξ (·), θ
∗
ξ
, R∗ξ). We first rewrite
the firm’s problem. To this end, let us denote the utility received by type θ under the contract
(pξ(θ), qξ(θ)) by U(θ) = vθ(qξ(θ))−pξ(θ). Then, by a standard argument in mechanism design, the





ln(qξ(θ̃) + 1)dθ̃ + U(θξ)
for θ ≥ θ
ξ
, qξ(·) being non-decreasing and qξ(θ) ≥ q(θ) for θ ≥ θξ. The PC constraint and optimality
then imply U(θ∗
ξ
) = 0. Then, the seller’s objective function can be rewritten by substituting








(θ ln(qξ(θ) + 1)−K − qξ(θ)c) dθ =∫ 1
θ
ξ







1{θ̃≤θ} · ln(qξ(θ̃) + 1)dθ̃ dθ =∫ 1
θ
ξ










((2θ − 1) ln(qξ(θ) + 1)−K − qξ(θ)c) dθ −Rξ (19)
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subject to
qξ(·) being non-decreasing and qξ(θ) ≥ q(θ) for θ ≥ θξ, (11’)





Next, we solve this maximization problem for ξ = 0. Point-wise maximization of the integral
with respect to q0(θ) for a fixed θ results in the first-order condition given by
2θ−1
q0(θ)+1
− c = 0,
i.e., q0(θ) =
2θ−1
c − 1 and a second-order condition given by −
2θ−1
(q0(θ)+1)2
< 0. Thus, the solution
of the first-order condition gives a maximum if θ > 12 and otherwise the unique solution of the
maximization problem is q0(θ) = 0.
If we plug this into (2θ − 1) ln(q0(θ) + 1)−K − q0(θ)c, we get for θ > 12 ,
(2θ − 1)(ln((2θ − 1)/c)− 1)−K + 1
which is strictly greater than zero for θ = 1 if − ln(c) − 1 − K + c > 0 which we assumed. It is
exactly zero at some θ∗
0
as long as K > c. Thus, (13) is a solution to the maximization problem
as it is increasing. Also, note that θ′ given by q0(θ
′) = q(θ′) is well defined as the equation has a
unique solution no more than 1 as long as K < − ln(c) which is implied by the parameter restriction
K < − ln(c)− 1 + c and c < 1. Then, q∗0(θ) > q(θ) if and only if θ > θ′.
Part 1: If ξ < r(1− θ∗
0
), then the unconstrained solution (the solution to (10) subject to (11))
is also achievable with the constraint (the solution to (10) subject to (11) and (12’)), so it is the
unique optimum and no free contracts or rewards are provided under the optimal scheme.
Part 2: If ξ ≥ r(1 − θ∗
0
), then profits are zero unless some reward is paid or the good is sold
to more buyers. It is immediate that the sender’s IC (12’) must be binding. To find the optimal
scheme, we can, hence, substitute ξ − r(1− θ
ξ









((2θ − 1) ln(qξ(θ) + 1)−K − qξ(θ)c+ r) dθ − ξ
subject to (11’), R∗ξ = ξ − r(1 − θξ) and p




ln(qξ(θ̃) + 1)dθ̃. Point-wise maxi-











−K − 2θ + 1− c+ r = 0






≥ θ′), which is equivalent to (14).
Otherwise, since q(·) is strictly decreasing, we need to apply bunching and offer a free contract
at the bottom because the pointwise solution max{q∗∗(θ), q(θ)} is decreasing for θ ∈ (0, θ′). More
precisely, there exist θξ and θ
∗
ξ
such that for θ ∈ [θ∗
ξ
, θξ], a free contract is offered, i.e., p
∗
ξ(θ) = 0
and q∗ξ (θ) = q(θ
∗
ξ
) for θ ∈ [θ∗
ξ
, θξ] under the optimal scheme.
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A strictly positive reward is paid if and only if ξ is strictly higher than the induced externality
r(1− θ∗
ξ
). This concludes the proof of (ii).
Proof. (Proposition 5) 1. If all senders choose Refer, the IC constraints for all senders— those
who see sH and those who see sL— must be satisfied. (a) Without free contracts, the senders’ IC
constraints are given by:
ξ ≤ αHr + (αHR(H) + (1− αH)R(L)) and ξ ≤ αLr + (αLR(H) + (1− αL)R(L)).
The optimal reward conditional on these constraints minimizes referral reward payments by making
both senders’ IC constraints binding whenever possible. The firm is able to do this if and only if
r ≤ ξ and in that case the optimal reward scheme is given by R(H) = ξ − r and R(L) = ξ. If






(b) With free contracts, the senders’ IC constraints are given by:
ξ ≤ r + (αHR(H) + (1− αH)R(L)) and ξ ≤ r + (αLR(H) + (1− αL)R(L)).
Thus, it is optimal to set R(H) = R(L) = max{ξ − r, 0}.
2. If senders who saw sL do not talk, then only the IC constraint of a sender who sees sH must
be satisfied and the IC constraint of the sender who sees sL must be violated.
(a) Without free contracts, the firm minimizes reward payments subject to these constraints by
minimizing αHR(H) + (1−αH)R(L) (i.e., making the IC for the sender with sH binding whenever
possible) such that
αLr + (αLR(H) + (1− αL)R(L)) < ξ ≤ αHr + (αHR(H) + (1− αH)R(L)).
First, note that these inequalities imply R(H) > R(L) − r. Second, if a referral scheme with
R(H),R(L) ≥ 0 that satisfies these inequalities exists (this is the case whenever ξαL − r ≥ 0), then
the referral scheme given by R(L) = 0, R(H) = max{ ξαH − r, 0} must maximize the seller’s profits:
The seller cannot increase profits by decreasing αHR(H) + (1− αH)R(L).
(b) With free contracts, the constraints become
r + (αLR(H) + (1− αL)R(L)) < ξ ≤ r + (αHR(H) + (1− αH)R(L)),
which imply R(H) > R(L). By an analogous argument as in (a), a reward scheme satisfying these
constraints exists if and only if ξ − r ≥ 0 and in that case the scheme given by R(H) = ξ−rαH ,
R(L) = 0 maximizes profits.
Proof. (Proposition 6) 1. First, note that any optimal scheme results in one of the following
three types of behaviors by the senders: Either (i) no senders talks, or (ii) all senders talk, or (iii)
only senders who have received a sH signal talk.
39
39Note that there is no optimal scheme in which sL-senders talk while sH -senders do not talk. This is because
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If ξ− r ≥ α(p∗H − cq∗H), then for all β ∈ (
1
2 , 1) the firm cannot make positive profits. We assume
from now on ξ − r < α(p∗H − cq∗H). We will show that for sufficiently large β, the firm can make
positive profits, i.e., that we are in case (ii) or (iii).
Fix β ∈ (12 , 1). If ξ − rαL ≤ 0, then all senders talk even without any reward payments as long
as H-type receivers consume a positive quantity. Thus, we are in case (ii), and so for any optimal
scheme ((pH , qH), (pL, qL),R), R(L) = 0 and qL = 0 hold.
We assume from now on that rαL < ξ < α(p
∗
H − cq∗H) + r. Under a reward scheme R with
R(L) = 0 (as specified in Proposition 5) and R(H) = max{ξ−αHr,0}αH , the senders who have seen sH
talk, while senders who have seen sL do not talk.
Next we show that, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it is not optimal to offer free
contracts and the firm always chooses to be in case (iii). For this purpose, we compute the profits
from cases (ii) and (iii).
• Case (iii): Since αH → 1 as β → 1, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it
is not optimal to offer free contracts by the analysis in Section 3. Thus, the profits are
given by αβ(p∗H − cq∗H)− (αβ + (1− α)(1− β)) max{ξ − αHr, 0}, which is greater than zero
for sufficiently large β because it converges to Π
∗
H ≡ α(p∗H − cq∗H) − αmax{ξ − r, 0} ≥
max{α(p∗H − cq∗H)− (ξ − r), α(p∗H − cq∗H)} > 0 as β → 1.
• Case (ii): We consider two cases: ξ ≥ r and ξ < r.
– ξ ≥ r: By Proposition 5, without free contracts, profits are given by α(p∗H−cq∗H)−(ξ−αr)
and with free contracts they are given by α(p∗H − cq∗H)−CF ∗− (ξ− r). Both profits are
strictly smaller than Π
∗
H .





and with free contracts, they are α(p∗H − cq∗H)−CF ∗. Both profits converge to numbers
that are smaller than Π
∗
H as β → 1.
Hence, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it is not optimal to offer free contracts and the
firm always chooses to be in case (iii). This concludes the proof.
2. If β = 12 , then one can immediately see from the expressions above that profits coincide with
the ones in the main section. Thus, by continuity, for any r < ξα , there exists a β̄ >
1
2 such that
for all β ∈ (12 , β̄), r <
ξ
αL








, there exists a β̄ > 12





























. Thus, there exists a β̄ > 12 such that for all β ∈ (
1
2 , β̄),
the same analysis as in the main section applies for β.
αH > αL and thus, given a scheme ((pH , qH), (pL, qL),R) where only sL-senders talk, the seller can strictly increase
profits by choosing a reward scheme R′ with R′(H) = R′(L) = αLR(H) + (1− αL)R(L) while holding the menu of
contracts fixed. Under this scheme, both sender types talk.
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